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Abstract
There is a broad consensus in the literature that costs of information processing and acquisition 
may generate costly disagreements in expectations among economic agents, and that central 
banks may play a central role in reducing such dispersion in expectations. This paper analyses 
empirically whether enhanced central bank transparency lowers dispersion among professional 
forecasters of key economic variables, using a large set of proxies for central bank transparency 
in 12 advanced economies. It finds evidence for a significant and sizeable effect of central bank 
transparency on forecast dispersion, be it by means of announcing a quantified inflation 
objective, other forms of communication, or by publishing central banks’ inflation and output 
forecasts. However, there also appear to be limits to central bank transparency, with decreasing 
marginal returns to enhancing (economic) transparency, and given our findings that 
disagreement among inflation expectations in the general public is not affected by the various 
central bank transparency measures analyzed in this paper. 
JEL classification: E37, E52, C53. 
Keywords: central banking, transparency, disagreement, survey expectations, monetary policy, 
inflation targeting, central bank communication, forecasting. 5
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Non-technical summary 
Deviating from the assumption of rational expectations, e.g. by assuming costs of information 
processing, leads to macroeconomic models that can generate disagreement among economic agents. In 
such models, there is a role for central bank transparency and communication to reduce the cost of 
information processing, either by increasing the precision of signals received by economic agents, or by 
making the information acquisition less costly. Over the last decades, central banks have undertaken 
great efforts in that direction, leading to major improvements in the predictability of their decisions 
and/or in the anchoring of inflation expectations. 
This paper studies to what extent greater central bank transparency and communication have contributed 
to a convergence in expectations of economic agents, by testing for their effects on the disagreement in 
forecasts of key macroeconomic variables. Compared to earlier contributions to this literature, our tests 
and proxies for central bank transparency and communication are substantially broader and more 
systematic. The paper finds empirical evidence that several of these measures (in particular the 
announcement of a quantified inflation objective and enhanced transparency about economic 
dimensions of the conduct of monetary policy, such as the release of the central bank’s internal forecasts 
of inflation and output) are effective in that regard, and that the effects are partially additive. The 
reduction in forecaster disagreement is not only statistically significant, but also economically 
important. The findings of the paper indicate that this reduction has been achieved because forecasters 
in countries with more transparent and open central banks manage to update their forecasts in response 
to news in a smoother fashion, generating less disagreement. 
At the same time, the findings of the paper also point at possible limits to the effects of central bank 
transparency. Increasing economic transparency seems to be particularly powerful at low levels of 
transparency. Yet at higher levels, the additional effects that can be reaped by further enhancements of 
economic transparency appear to be much smaller. Furthermore, the present paper does not find that the 
dispersion in expectations among the general public (in contrast to those of professional forecasters) is 
affected by any of the various measures of central bank transparency that it analyzes.  6
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1. Introduction
Many modern macroeconomic models assume that all agents form full-information rational 
expectations. Under this assumption, all economic agents share a common information set and form 
expectations conditional on that information, indicating that everyone has the same expectations, and 
there are no disagreements. However, this assumption is easily rejected when looking at forecast survey 
data, where disagreements, e.g. in inflation forecasting, appear to be particularly substantial. A variety 
of explanations have been offered to explain these findings. For example, Mankiw and Reis (2002) 
propose a sticky-information model, in which economic agents update their expectations only 
periodically because of costs of collecting and processing information. Using this model, Mankiw, Reis 
and Wolfers (2003) show that disagreement exhibits substantial variation through time, moving with 
inflation, the absolute value of the change in inflation, and relative price variability. Woodford (2001) 
argues for an imperfect-information model, in which agents observe a noisy signal about the current 
state. Sims (2003) argues that individual agent has limited capacity for processing information, and we 
must thus add information-processing constraints to model behavior in macroeconomic models. 
In all these cases, economic outcomes could be improved if it was possible to ensure that agents update 
their information sets more frequently, that the signals were observed with less noise, or if the cost of 
information processing was reduced. Accordingly, there might be a role for central bank transparency 
and communication in shaping better economic outcomes. Of course, neither is relevant when assuming 
that the public has full-information rational expectations. If the public understood monetary policy 
perfectly, any systematic pattern in the way that policy is conducted should be correctly inferred from 
the central bank's observed behavior (Woodford, 2005). Thus, when predicting future interest rates, it 
suffices to interpret (forecasts of) economic data in view of the central bank's policy rule. On the 
contrary, the assumption of imperfect information is crucial for central bank communication and 
transparency. Imperfect information generates disagreements among forecasters, making the economy 
volatile. Via communication and transparency, central banks may anchor market expectations, reduce 
volatility in the economy, and thus achieve a better economic (inflation) performance. 
Central banks have over the last decades started to play this role, by becoming remarkably more 
transparent, and by actively using communication as an instrument to steer agents’ expectations. A large 
academic literature has accompanied these processes, and has identified numerous ways in which they 
have turned out to be beneficial to the conduct of monetary policy. As pointed out, e.g., in the survey of 
the literature on central bank communication by Blinder et al. (2008), the anchoring of inflation 
expectations has been one point in case, and an improved predictability of monetary policy decisions 
another.  
In this paper we investigate whether and to what extent central bank communication and increased 
transparency have affected the disagreement among private agents’ forecasts of inflation, interest rates, 
and other macroeconomic variables. Our hypothesis is that we should see a reduction in forecast 
dispersion if i) information-related deviations from the rational expectation assumptions outlined above 
hold, and if ii) central banks manage to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of their public communication, 
or alternatively to reduce the cost of information processing by making relevant pieces of information 
available more readily.  
For that purpose, we use two kinds of datasets in our empirical analysis. The first one is the Consensus 
Economics forecast data from 1990 to 2008, which covers professional analysts’ forecasts of various 
macroeconomic variables for 12 advanced economies, over different forecasting horizons The second is 
the European Commission household survey data (Eurobarometer) from 1985 to 2008, which measures 
inflation expectations of the general public. We find that central bank transparency and communication 
are indeed powerful tools to reduce the dispersion of professional forecasters’ views. These effects can 
be generated by announcing a quantified inflation objective, by being transparent about the economic 
data and the policy models, as well as by publishing internal forecasts, and are therefore based on a 7
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broad set of central bank policies. They are also economically large, with reductions in dispersion 
reaching up to 20%.  
How is this reduction in heterogeneity brought about? The paper shows that the updating process of 
forecasts in response to macroeconomic news generates less dispersion in the case of more transparent 
central banks, or if the news are accompanied by explicit central bank communication. This suggests 
that the private sector can gain a clearer understanding of the implications of news on the future 
evolution of the economy if aided by central banks. At the same time, the paper also identifies possible 
limits to the effectiveness of these central bank measures. In particular, there is some evidence for 
diminishing marginal returns in (economic) transparency, and the paper finds that neither of the central 
bank measures affects the disagreement among the general public, while the levels of inflation 
expectations of the public are responsive to the announcement of a quantified inflation objective or 
increasing economic transparency. 
This paper relates to an emerging literature that studies the determinants of disagreement among 
economic agents, and the role of central banks (for a detailed overview of the respective papers, see 
Table A1 in the Appendix).
1 As to the determinants of disagreement, Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2009) use three different surveys of economic forecasts to assess both the support for and the properties 
of informational rigidities faced by agents. Specifically, they track the impulse responses of mean 
forecast errors and disagreement among agents after exogenous structural shocks. They conclude that 
after structural shocks, agents fail to adjust their forecasts by a sufficient amount, inducing a non-zero 
response of forecast errors. As time goes by, forecast errors converge monotonically to the full 
information outcome. They interpret these results as providing a robust empirical basis for models of 
informational rigidities that has previously been sorely lacking. In a similar fashion, Andrade and Le 
Bihan (2009) find that rational inattention can explain some of the disagreement in the ECB’s Survey of 
Professional Forecasters, although other factors must also be at work, given that these models cannot 
generate sufficient stickiness in expectations.  
Capistran and Timmermann (2009) go beyond the models that base different views of forecasters on 
differences in information sets and assume that agents weight the consequences of over- and under-
predictions differently and, as a result, calculate their forecasts under asymmetric loss with a shape of 
the loss function that differs across agents. The authors find empirical evidence of such asymmetries in 
forecasters’ loss functions. Finally, Dovern, Fritsche and Slacalek (2009) investigate determinants of 
disagreement about six key economic indicators using the Consensus Economics dataset from G7 
countries. Their estimates document a dichotomy between disagreement about real variables (GDP, 
consumption, investment and unemployment), which is more strongly affected by real factors, and 
disagreement about nominal variables (inflation and interest rate), which reacts to the institutional 
setting of monetary policy (in particular central bank independence). Disagreement about real variables 
intensifies strongly during recessions. Disagreement about nominal variables is considerably lower 
under independent central banks. Cross-sectional dispersion for both groups increases with uncertainty 
about the underlying indicators. Their findings suggest that more credible monetary policy can 
substantially contribute to the anchoring of expectations about nominal variables; however its effects on 
disagreement about real variables are moderate. 
Other papers on the role of central banks for forecaster disagreement can be divided by the central bank 
measures that are analyzed. Swanson (2006) focuses on central bank transparency in general, and finds 
that with increased transparency of the US Federal Reserve, private sector forecasts of US interest rates 
have become more precise, both by improving the average quality of forecasts as well as by reducing 
their dispersion across forecasters. A related finding is presented in Bauer et al. (2006), who show that 
since 1994 (when the FOMC began to release statements accompanying changes in the policy rate) 
forecasts for key macroeconomic variables by market participants have become substantially more 
synchronized. Fujiwara (2005) examines how a central bank’s economic forecasts affect forecasts by 
1 For a study on the effect of central bank communication on the rationality of private sector forecasts, see 
Chortareas et al. (2009). 8
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professional forecasters and vice versa, looking at the case of the Bank of Japan. Empirical results show 
that while central bank economic forecasts are not significantly influenced by professional forecasts of 
inflation, they have a notable effect on professional forecasts. Furthermore, tests on the second moment 
suggest that the Bank of Japan’s forecast reduces professional forecasters’ uncertainty about the future.  
A number of studies relate to the announcement of a quantified inflation objective. Beechey, Johannsen 
and Levin (2007) compare the recent evolution of long-run inflation expectations in the euro area and 
the United States as provided in the respective Surveys of Professional Forecasters. They reveal 
substantially greater dispersion across forecasters’ long-horizon projections of US than of euro area 
inflation, and relate this to the fact that the ECB has announced a definition of price stability, whereas 
the Federal Reserve has not. Crowe (2006) test whether inflation targeting enhances transparency, using 
inflation forecast data obtained from the Consensus Economics dataset for 11 inflation targeters. The 
paper outlines a simple signal-extraction model and derives a testable proposition: if inflation targeting 
enhances transparency in the manner assumed in the model, then its introduction should promote 
convergence to lower forecast errors. The author finds that convergence occurs in all countries due to 
mean-reversion, but that the adoption of inflation targeting leads to greater convergence, as predicted by 
the model, which serves as strong evidence that inflation targeting does indeed enhance transparency. In 
a similar vein, Crowe and Meade (2007, 2008) find that enhanced transparency practices are associated 
with the private sector making greater use of information provided by the central bank, which supports 
Crowe's (2006) finding that the introduction of inflation targeting (thereby increasing in their 
transparency score) is associated with a convergence in forecast errors among the private sector. At the 
same time, Cecchetti and Hakkio (2009) find no or only small effects of the adoption of inflation targets 
on forecast dispersion, and Capistran and Ramos-Francia (2009) identify such effects only for 
developing countries. 
All the studies listed so far relate to the disagreement among professional forecasters. Much less work 
has been done with regard to the views of the general public, most likely given the lack of data 
availability in this context.
2 Two exceptions are Maag and Lamla (2009) as well as Badarinza and 
Buchmann (2009), both of which find evidence that media coverage affects inflation forecast 
disagreement of households. 
This paper contributes to these strands of the literature by expanding the relevant tests. Whereas most 
papers focus on one measure of central bank transparency or communication, we broaden the analysis in 
this respect, allowing for a comparison of the relative strengths of the effects. We will do so for a large 
set of countries, and furthermore comparing the responsiveness of professional forecasters to the one of 
the general public. The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 discusses the data used in the 
empirical analysis. Section 3 reports on the effects of central bank transparency and communication on 
private sector forecasts. Section 4 summarizes the findings and draws some policy implications. 
2. The data and the econometric model 
To test for the effects of central bank transparency on private sector forecasts, we employ various data 
sets. This section provides a detailed description of the private sector forecast data, our measures for 
central bank transparency and communication, and other control variables. 
2 In this respect it should be noticed that the effects of central bank transparency and communication on 
professional forecasters are likely to be more direct and significant than those regarding the general public, given 
that the latter receive their information indirectly via the media or via professionals (Carroll 2003). Van der 
Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2007) show, using household survey data, that actual and perceived transparency in the 
general public may deviate, making the effects of transparency on the public less obvious.         9
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2.1 Private sector forecast data  
As to the private sector forecasts, we focus on the data provided by Consensus Economics. These 
comprise professional forecasts for a large range of variables, for different horizons, and are available 
for a reasonably long history for a set of industrialized countries. They have also been used in the 
related studies by Crowe (2006) and Dovern et al. (2009). 
In particular, we have available the micro data for 7 countries of the European Union (France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and 5 other countries (Canada, Japan, 
Norway, Switzerland and the United States). The data are monthly, starting from January 1990 (January 
1995 for the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden; June 1998 for Norway and Switzerland) and running 
through November 2008. For the 5 euro area countries in our sample (France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain), we do therefore cover the time prior to monetary union as well as membership 
in the euro area. Note, however, that the consensus forecast data are country-specific (e.g., French 
forecasters provide their estimates of French inflation, etc.). Accordingly, the dependent variables in our 
regressions remain country-specific even after 1999. While some of the explanatory variables (namely 
the transparency indices and the dummy variable for central banks with a quantified inflation objective) 
relate to the ECB, and are thus identical across the euro area countries after 1999, the central bank 
communication variable remains country-specific. In the econometric estimates, it will therefore be 
important to calculate appropriate standard errors. 
To cover a broad range of economic indicators, we will analyze forecasts for consumer price inflation 
(% change p.a.), real GDP growth (% change p.a.), unemployment (% of labor force), 3-month interest 
rates and 10-year government bond yields. Importantly, the first three forecasts are made for the end of 
the current year and for the end of the next year, whereas interest rate forecasts are made for a fixed 
horizon of 3 and 12 months. In particular the year-end forecasts therefore require careful modeling: over 
the course of a given year, the forecast horizon decreases; whereas a year-end forecast in January spans 
nearly an entire year, the forecasting problem in November is much simpler, as much of the year’s data 
are already realized and released. A model of dispersion or forecast errors will therefore have to control 
for the forecast horizon, as we would expect both to decline over the course of a year. As we will 
describe below, all econometric models will therefore contain a full set of month-fixed effects. 
We have deliberately opted for a broad coverage of economic indicators to probe the extent to which 
forecasts are affected. Forecasts of interest rates are obviously very closely linked to expectations about 
the future course of monetary policy, and these in turn should be more aligned to the extent that the 
central bank’s reaction function and assessment of the current economic situation are better understood. 
With regard to forecasts for inflation, GDP growth and unemployment, a more homogeneous 
understanding of the central bank’s reaction function will only lead to a partial alignment, as long as 
agents do not have similar views about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. However, some 
of our proxies for central bank transparency (discussed in more detail below) relate to whether central 
banks publish their macroeconomic policy models – which, in turn, could align agents’ views about the 
transmission process. Also, we will test whether the publication of the central bank’s inflation and 
output growth forecasts reduces dispersion among the private sector forecasters, such that we are 
particularly interested in the effects on precisely those variables. 
On average, the dataset comprises 18 forecasters per country and month, although there is some 
variation. For instance, survey participation is relatively smaller in the Netherlands and Norway, with 10 
forecasters on average, whereas the number of forecasters in the United Kingdom is relatively large, 
with 29 on average. Table 1 provides an overview of the forecaster coverage. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
Note that analysts need not give their forecast for every single variable and every forecasting horizon 
each time. Accordingly, the number of actual forecasts differs slightly across variables. Our dataset 10
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contains around 41,000 to 42,000 observations for inflation and GDP forecasts, whereas the number of 
forecasts for unemployment and interest rates is somewhat lower, at around 31,000 to 38,000. 
For the purposes of this paper, we are interested in measures of cross-sectional dispersion on the one 
hand, and of forecast accuracy on the other. As explained in the introduction, our focus is on the effects 
of central bank transparency and communication on cross-sectional dispersion, as we are interested in 
the extent to which central banks can make the information acquisition of the private sector more 
effective. At the same time, however, it is also important to test how forecast accuracy is affected, as we 
need to ensure that transparent and communicative central banks do not align forecasts at lower levels 
of accuracy. While we would expect that more transparency and communication improves accuracy, 
this need not necessarily show up in our econometric estimates, for the following reason: Forecasts with 
more transparent and better communicating central banks might be qualitatively more accurate than 
otherwise ex ante. What we observe, however, is only forecast accuracy ex post, i.e. after the realization 
of shocks. The ex ante forecast accuracy is not observable. If it were the case that central bank 
transparency and communication is correlated with the incidence of large, unexpected shocks (for 
instance, because central banks in small open economies – which are more subject to shocks and 
therefore more volatile – are more inclined to stabilize agents’ expectations by being more transparent), 
ex post forecast accuracy might turn out to be lower under more transparent central banks.
3 We will 
consequently take the analysis of forecast accuracy as a robustness test rather than as the focal point of 
this paper.  
Our preferred measure of cross-sectional dispersion is, in line with the literature (Mankiw et al. 2003, 
Dovern et al. 2009), the inter-quartile range of forecasts in a given country and month. The advantage 
of this measure over the simple standard deviation is that it is insensitive to outliers, which might be 
important in the analysis of survey data. We will, in any case, check for robustness of our results by 
using the standard deviation.
4 For a measure of forecast accuracy, we will calculate the average
absolute forecast error per country and month.  
Table 2 provides some summary statistics for the resulting variables. The dataset comprises 2342 
country-month observations for most forecasts (albeit for unemployment, only 1589 observations are 
available). The inter-quartile range is on average around 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points, although it ranges 
from forecasts where the 25
th as well as the 75
th percentile of forecasters expressed the same view to 
those where the differences amounted to around 2 percentage points. Mean absolute forecast errors are 
comparably scaled, ranging on average from around 0.4 to 1.2 percentage points, and spanning for the 
individual variables a broader range from 0 to 6.7 percentage points. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
In order to contrast the results for the professional forecasts to those for the general public, we will also 
make use of a second dataset, which is based on the European Commission’s Consumer Survey. This 
survey is also conducted monthly, covering around 1000 respondents in 20 European Union countries. 
The data are available to us starting from January 1985 at the earliest, through November 2008.
5
3 For this and other reasons, our econometric models will include country fixed effects. Still, the same argument 
might apply if the change in central bank transparency is correlated with the change in an economy’s exposure to 
shocks.  
4 It is important to note that this measure is not necessarily a good proxy for uncertainty about the variable to be 
forecasted. As shown by D’Amico and Orphanides (2008), disagreement across forecasters is not necessarily 
equivalent to the inflation uncertainty expressed by forecasters in the form of probabilistic responses, as in the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters. While this is important to keep in mind when interpreting our results, we are 
primarily interested in the determinants of disagreement rather than uncertainty. 
5 More precisely, the data cover Belgium, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
since 1985m1; Spain (1986m6); Latvia (1993m1); Hungary (1993m2); Estonia (1993m4); Czech Republic 
(1995m1); Austria and Sweden (1995m10); Finland (1995m11); Slovenia (1996m3); Cyprus, Lithuania, Poland 
and Romania (2001m5). The remaining countries (amongst which, for instance, Germany) conduct the survey, but 
do not make the breakdown of the response shares per answer category available on the Eurostat website. 11
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Different to the Consensus Economics dataset, only inflation forecasts are contained in the consumer 
survey – and furthermore, these are not quantitative, but rather only qualitative. Respondents are asked 
to indicate whether, in their view, prices will, over the next 12 months, i) increase more rapidly, ii) 
increase at the same rate, iii) increase at a slower rate, iv) stay about the same, or v) fall.  
While the micro data are not directly available, the share of responses in the various categories is mostly 
substantial. This allows us to construct a measure of dispersion, which needs to reflect the qualitative 
nature of the responses. We therefore opted for the measure proposed by Lacy (2006), and also applied 
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where Fj is the cumulative relative frequency of the j
th category. Note that the 5
th category can be 
excluded, given that its cumulative relative frequency is equal to one, and accordingly does not provide 
any relevant information about the distribution of the variable.
6
Unfortunately, the qualitative nature of the question does not allow constructing a measure of forecast 
accuracy. The European Commission releases a balance statistic that is supposed to provide an 
aggregated measure of the responses, based on the formula 
) 5 . 0 ( ) 5 . 0 ( MM M P PP B            ( 2 )  
where PP denotes the share of responses expecting prices to increase more rapidly, P the share of 
responses that prices will increase at the same rate, M equivalently for expectations of prices to stay 
about the same, and MM referring to expectations that prices will fall. We will analyze this balance 
statistic to test whether central bank transparency and communication can affect the level of inflation 
expectations. Given that quantitative surveys on inflation expectations have typically concluded that 
consumers tend to overestimate inflation by non-negligible amounts (Bryan and Venkatu 2001), we take 
this to suggest that a reduction in the level of inflation expectations is equivalent to an improvement in 
forecast accuracy. For both measures (d
2 and the balance statistic), our dataset comprises 3967 country-
month observations.  
It is of course apparent that the two datasets differ along various dimensions. Our main interest are the 
different target groups across the two data sources, with professional forecasters in the Consensus 
Economics survey, and the general public in the EC’s Consumer Survey. At the same time, however, 
the latter survey asks a qualitative question, whereas the former is interested in a quantified forecast, 
and the coverage of countries and across time differs. This of course limits the comparability of results. 
At the same time, we are not aware of any other consumer survey that is done in a comparable fashion 
across countries, asks quantitative questions, and spans a sufficiently long time sample.  
2.2 Measures of central bank transparency  
Being interested in how central bank transparency and communication affect private sector forecasts, 
we need to define measures for the former. To be as broad as possible, we have constructed four such 
measures. The first one relates to whether or not a central bank has announced a quantified inflation 
objective. This measure is constructed as a dummy variable, taking the value of one as of the month 
6 To construct this measure, we have excluded the “don’t know” response shares, and calculated the cumulative 
relative frequencies just taking into account the response shares of the remaining answer categories. This measure 
has the advantage that it does not require the quantification of the distances between the various answer categories. 
The measure will be equal to zero if all responses fall into a single category, and it will be equal to one, its 
maximum value, if 50% of respondents expect prices to rise more rapidly and 50% expect prices to fall.  12
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when the quantified inflation objective was adopted (as, e.g., in Ball and Sheridan 2005), according to 
the central bank websites. Alternatives to the adoption dates might be the announcement date (as, e.g., 
in Bernanke et al. 1999), or alternatively a later date to allow for a build-up of credibility (see, e.g., 
Goldberg and Klein 2005 for the ECB). By opting for the adoption date, we place ourselves in the 
middle of these alternatives. For the Consensus Economics dataset, 7 out of the 12 countries adopt a 
quantified inflation objective over the course of our sample period, two countries (Spain and Sweden) 
are considered to have a quantified inflation objective throughout (note that their data only start in 
1995), and the remaining three countries (Switzerland, Japan and the United States) do not have a 
quantified inflation objective over the entire sample.  
A second set of variables relates to more general measures of central bank transparency. Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006) have developed a central bank transparency index, which is an aggregate of subindices 
relating to (1) political, (2) economic, (3) procedural, (4) policy and (5) operational transparency. This 
index has recently been extended and updated for a large set of countries by Dincer and Eichengreen 
(2009). The data is annual and covers the period from 1998 to 2006. In light of the large number of 
subindices, we will concentrate on the overall index, as well as the subindex related to economic 
transparency.
7 A detailed explanation of the construction of these data is provided in Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006); for the purposes of this paper, it shall suffice to state that central banks are given ranks 
between 0 and 3 for economic transparency, depending on (a) whether they provide timely information 
on key economic data (money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization), (b) 
whether or not central banks announce what policy models are employed internally, and finally (and 
probably most important for our purposes) (c) whether or not central banks release numerical internal 
forecasts for inflation and/or output. The overall index is a simple aggregate of the 5 subindices, each of 
which can vary from 0 to 3, such that the overall index is defined over a range from 0 to 15. For the 
Consensus Economics dataset, the economic transparency index ranges from 1 to 3, whereas the overall 
index takes values in between 6 and 15.  
One important issue relates to the relatively short time sample for which these data are available. To 
maintain a maximum number of observations, we have decided to use the 1998 data for all earlier years, 
and to assume that in the years 2007 and 2008, the 2006 indices are still applicable. Of course, we have 
tested for the robustness of our results using only the actual transparency data. 
A last measure for central bank transparency is closely related to one aspect of the economic 
transparency index, namely whether central banks publish their internal forecasts for inflation and 
output. We have constructed a variable (which we will label central bank communication) that is equal 
to one in those months where such forecasts are published, and zero otherwise. Practices across central 
banks differ widely with regard to the specific nature of the forecasts; for instance, some central banks 
release forecasts that are owned by the decision-making body, whereas others provide staff forecasts. 
Also, practices differ with regard to the underlying assumptions about the future path of interest rates, 
which could be assumed to be constant, based on market interest rates, or reflect the central bank’s own 
forecast. Finally, the forecasting horizons are also different across central banks. Unfortunately, the 
dataset does not contain sufficient variation in order to test for the effects of different practices 
separately. Instead, we pool all these forecast releases in one dummy variable, assuming that regardless 
of their precise nature, they provide useful signals to the public which in turn might align private sector 
forecasts. For the countries of the euro area, we consider both the relevant publications of the ECB as 
well as of the National Central Banks. Whereas the former provides staff projections for the euro area as 
a whole, we prefer to treat this as relevant information also for the national forecasts, given that this 
potentially allows forecasters to better assess the future course of monetary policy, which in turn might 
allow for more accurate (or more aligned) national forecasts. A robustness test for the inclusion of ECB 
staff projections for the euro area will be conducted. A final note on the construction of the central bank 
communication variable relates to the precise timing. Given that the Consensus Economics survey takes 
place at the beginning of a month, we have made sure that the central bank publication can affect the 
7 It should be noted that we have tested also the subindices for political, procedural, policy and operational 
transparency, which didn’t prove to be significant in reducing the dispersion among professional forecasters.  13
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survey. If it takes place after the collection of the Consensus Economics data, we enter it in the 
subsequent month.  
One might expect that these four variables measure related concepts, and are therefore positively 
correlated. Table 3 displays the correlation coefficients, some of which are indeed relatively large. It is 
apparent that central banks with a quantified inflation objective are on average more transparent. At the 
same time, the correlation coefficient with economic transparency is not that high, presumably because 
also many other central banks fare relatively high on the economic transparency ranking. Central bank 
communication is least correlated with the other measures, which is explained by the fact that it contains 
much more time variation: whereas all other measures are best described by step functions, our 
communication measure switches between the values zero and one repeatedly (in many cases, the 
relevant publications take place quarterly, or semi-annually, leading to non-zero entries for 4 or 2 
months a year, respectively). These correlation coefficients suggest that in our empirical analysis it will 
not always be possible to clearly identify which measure is triggering an effect. At the same time, we 
are comforted by the relatively low correlation measures between quantified inflation objectives, 
economic transparency, and central bank communication. Note that we will subsume all of these 
variables under the heading of central bank transparency, even though we will use the term also for the 
narrower definition of the central bank transparency index. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
2.3 Control variables 
When explaining cross-sectional forecaster dispersion, a number of other factors need to be considered. 
Most straightforwardly, it is important to include month fixed effects, as well as country fixed effects in 
any model. The former are necessary due to the changing forecasting horizon in the Consensus 
Economics survey, as discussed above. The latter can take account of a myriad of issues that might have 
a bearing on the dispersion that we observe on average in a given country, such as the quality of the 
forecaster pool, the difficulty in forecasting a given economy (e.g. because smaller economies are more 
prone to shocks, and as such might ceteris paribus be relatively more volatile), or possibly the 
availability of a well-established forecasting institution that might affect the views expressed in this 
survey. 
Following Capistran and Timmermann (2009), we also include the conditional volatility of the variable 
that needs to be forecasted. Such a control variable is useful for two reasons. First, higher volatility can 
imply a more difficult forecasting task which, in turn, might increase cross-sectional dispersion. Second, 
our estimation sample is in large part coinciding with the so-called great moderation, i.e. a stable 
macroeconomic environment. At the same time, central banks have become more transparent over the 
sample. In order not to confuse the two time variations, it is important to control for the impact of the 
great moderation. We do this by including the conditional volatility of the variable that needs to be 
forecasted.
8 In concordance with the approach of Capistran and Timmermann (2009), we estimated 
GARCH(1,1) models (where for our purposes 2 lags proved to be sufficient to reduce remaining serial 
correlation), and extracted the estimates of the conditional volatility. Adding the level of the variable to 
be forecasted (e.g. because inflation might be more difficult to forecast when it is high) does not affect 
our results, and generates issues of correlated regressors, given that the conditional volatility and the 
level of the variables are highly correlated. We have, therefore, decided to only include the conditional 
volatility measure. The actual data on the variables to be forecasted was sourced from the OECD’s Main 
Economic Indicators database. 
8 An alternative would be to include time fixed effects in the model, which would control for all time variation that 
is common across countries, i.e. both for possible common variations due to the great moderation and due to 
changes in central bank transparency. However, effects stemming from a common time variation in central bank 
transparency would then no longer be identifiable. Furthermore, the conditional volatility of the variable to be 
forecasted is more direct, as it allows for a country-specific control for the great moderation. 14
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Furthermore, we include the absolute change in oil prices (sourced from the Bank for International 
Settlements) that was observed prior to the survey, to incorporate possible effects this variable might 
have on the evolution of forecasts, and the disagreement among forecasters in particular. Importantly, 
the inclusion of this variable does not change our results.  
A final set of variables that we include in the extension of the empirical models relates to the news 
component of macroeconomic announcements. With new macroeconomic data arriving, forecasters 
need to update their information set and adjust their forecasts. This in itself might affect forecaster 
disagreement; an interesting hypothesis in that respect is whether the adjustment in forecasts can take 
place in a “smoother” fashion under transparent central banks, and as such would lead to a relatively 
smaller increase in cross-sectional dispersion.
9
To test for this possibility, we have constructed a series of macroeconomic announcements and the 
surprise component contained therein. Following the standard in the announcement literature (see, e.g., 
Andersen et al. 2003), we deduct the expectation of the announcement from the actual announcement 
value of the variable to get a measure of the surprise component, and standardize these surprises by their 
own, national, standard deviation. Due to this standardization, the regression coefficients for each series 
can be interpreted as a response per one national standard deviation surprise. As is standard in this 
literature, we obtained data on expectations of the macroeconomic releases from a survey among 
financial market participants conducted by Bloomberg Financial Services, and use the median response 
as our measure of expectations. It is important to note, however, that these data are not available for the 
entire sample period. To maximize the sample, we focus on the releases of inflation and unemployment, 
for which the Bloomberg surveys have the longest history. As with the central bank communication 
variable, we ensure that the data release is appropriately assigned to the relevant Consensus Economics 
forecast round.
10
3. The effects of central bank transparency on private sector forecasts 
What effects do central banks exert on private sector forecasts by means of their transparency and 
communication? This section presents the empirical results. We will first focus on a benchmark 
regression that analyzes the determinants of the inter-quartile range in the Consensus Economics 
forecasts, before expanding  the analysis and testing its robustness in several ways. Following this, we 
will turn to an analysis of the responsiveness to news shocks, and then probe the limits of the effects of 
central bank transparency.  
3.1  Overall effects  
Our benchmark econometric model is given as  
t c i t t c i t c i t c m c t c i oil x , , 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , , , H J J J E D D  '  6  :      :       (3) 
where  t c i , , :  denotes our dependent variable, i.e. the cross-sectional forecast dispersion for forecast i in 
country c at time t, or alternatively the absolute mean forecast error, and  c D  and  m D  stand for the 
9 This test is related to the influential work by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), who show that, in response 
to macroeconomic news shocks, long-term inflation expectations are better anchored in inflation-targetting 
countries. 
10 An alternative might be to use the magnitude of the change in the announced values for the macroeconomic 
releases, assuming that larger changes require more substantial forecast revisions, and as such could raise 
disagreement. Our preferred measure is based on the shocks – assuming that if large parts of a macroeconomic 
release have not been foreseen, this should trigger more substantive revisions, whereas a large change in the 
announcement could have been foreseen, and therefore already factored into the earlier forecast rounds. 15
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country and month fixed effects. Our measures for central bank transparency and communication are 
given by  t c x , ; t c i , , 6  marks the conditional volatility of the variable to be forecasted, and  1  ' t oil
denotes the absolute change in oil prices in the preceding month. As outlined in detail in section 2, our 
hypotheses are that disagreement among forecasters should depend negatively on central bank 
transparency and communication ( 0  E ), that disagreement is likely to be persistent ( 0 1 ! J ), and that 
higher volatility of the variable increases disagreement ( 0 2 ! J ), as do larger oil price changes ( 0 3 ! J ).
We estimate different variants of this model, including different measures of : (inter-quartile range 
and mean absolute error), for different forecasts i (varying the variable to be forecasted as well as the 
horizon), and different central bank transparency and communication measures x each time (although 
we will also estimate a joint model for three central bank measures for each forecast). The models will 
be estimated by simple OLS. Since our observations are clustered by country, the standard errors are 
estimated taking the cluster structure into account.
11
Table 4 provides the results parameter estimates obtained in the benchmark model. Column (1) contains 
the estimates testing for the importance of quantified inflation objectives, column (2) for overall 
transparency, column (3) for economic transparency, and column (4) includes our central bank 
communication variable. Column (5) combines quantified inflation objectives, economic transparency, 
and communication (the three central bank measures with the lowest correlation coefficients) in a joint 
model.  
TABLE 4 HERE 
All models contain the various control variables discussed in the preceding section. To save space, the 
regression coefficients for the month and country fixed effects are not provided. It is important to note, 
however, that especially the former are extremely relevant for the year-end forecasts. Not only are they 
highly statistically significant at the 1% level and large in magnitude (the inter-quartile range in 
December is up to 80% lower than in January for the current-year forecasts, and up to 20% for the next-
year forecasts), but their importance also increases monotonically over the course of the year. Country 
effects are at times significant, but not as consistently so as the month effects. 
The results for the other control variables show that disagreement is indeed persistent. The own lag has 
statistically significant and sizable coefficients. As these are significantly smaller than one, 
disagreement is, however, not described by a unit root process. Also the conditional volatility of a 
variable is apparently an important determinant of disagreement, with large and (for all forecasts) 
statistically significant effects. Oil prices, in contrast, seem to affect only a number of forecasts, such as 
interest rate forecasts at the 3-month horizon and inflation forecasts for the subsequent year. In these 
cases, larger oil price changes do, as to be expected, increase disagreement. 
Turning to our variables of interest, the central bank transparency and communication measures, it is 
apparent that there is a large majority of cases where more transparency reduces disagreement.
12 In 
many cases the effect is statistically significant, and the coefficients are furthermore always negative. 
The largest effects are exerted by the adoption of quantified inflation objectives and by increasing the 
level of economic transparency: with a quantified inflation objective, the inter-quartile range of forecast 
11 This assumes that errors are correlated within, but uncorrelated across countries. For the euro area countries, it 
might be possible that errors are also correlated across countries, given that the central bank measures are partially 
identical. We have therefore tested whether allowing for correlated errors within the non-euro area countries and 
within the euro area affects our results, and note that this is not the case. If anything, the standard errors when 
clustering by country are slightly more conservative, and are therefore reported in this paper. 
12 It might be surprising to find that the disagreement in CPI forecasts is not affected by all central bank 
transparency measures. At the same time, however, it is important to note that monetary policy affects inflation 
only with rather long lags, which are often estimated in the range of 1.5 to 2 years. The forecast horizons in this 
dataset might therefore be too short to reflect possible effects of enhanced central bank transparency. 16
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dispersion is reduced by 7 to 19% (depending on the variable we look at), and an improvement in the 
economic transparency index by one lowers the inter-quartile range by 6 to 20%. This compares to a 
reduction of up to 5% if the overall transparency index increases by one, and of up to 10% in the central 
bank communication months.  
In addition, these effects are partially additive, especially when it comes to the interest rate forecasts. 
The models in column (5) show that in many cases, there are joint effects of quantified inflation 
objectives, economic transparency and/or communication, which add to larger reductions than estimated 
in the separate models. Another important result is that the dispersion-reducing effect, which is apparent 
for the overall transparency index is nearly entirely generated by the contribution of economic 
transparency. Constructing an overall transparency index excluding economic transparency, and re-
estimating the econometric models shows that the other dimensions of transparency manage to reduce 
dispersion only in the case of long-term interest rate forecasts. 
These results are robust to a number of model variations, such as using the standard deviation instead of 
the inter-quartile range, or allowing for correlated errors within the non-euro area countries and within 
the euro area (i.e. dropping the assumption of uncorrelated errors across the euro area countries). 
Similary, a reclassification of the Deutsche Bundesbank (prior to 1999) as a central bank with a 
quantified inflation objective, given that it had released the so-called “inflation norm”, does not affect 
results. What is important, though, is the treatment of the ECB. Excluding the ECB staff projections 
from the communication variable, or dropping the ECB from the set of central banks with quantified 
inflation objectives (such that all remaining central banks in the group are defined as formal inflation 
targeters) implies much reduced effects for the communication variable and the quantified inflation 
objective on dispersion, respectively. Against the background that 5 of our 12 countries in the sample 
are members of the euro area, this change in results is not all too surprising, and suggests the following. 
First, the ECB staff projections, although for the euro area, are useful information in predicting the main 
macroeconomic variables in the euro area national economies. Second, for the purpose of aligning 
agents’ expectations of these variables, what matters is not that a central bank follows a formal inflation 
targeting policy, but rather that it announces a quantified inflation objective. For brevity, these 
robustness tests are not reported in the paper. 
Another robustness test is contained in Table 5. As mentioned above, we have expanded the sample for 
the transparency indices beyond those originally available, by extrapolating using the first observation 
forward, i.e. for the years prior to 1998, and the last observation backward, for 2007 and 2008. Using 
only the original data covering the years 1998 to 2006 reduces sample size by around half. Accordingly, 
there are fewer statistically significant effects. However, for a number of forecasts, statistical 
significance remains, and with only one exception, these cases point to a reduction in forecaster 
disagreement when transparency is enhanced. This is particularly the case for the interest rate forecasts. 
TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE 
The final robustness test is provided in Table 6. Here, we attempt to explain the mean absolute error, i.e. 
a measure of forecast accuracy, rather than the inter-quartile range, our measure of dispersion, in 
otherwise identical models. As we had conjectured in the preceding section, there is some, but weaker 
evidence that central bank transparency and communication improves (ex post) forecast accuracy.  
Taken together, these results suggest that there are various ways through which central banks can reduce 
forecast dispersion, with the announcement of a quantified inflation objective and enhanced economic 
transparency being the most potent channels. Additional effects can be achieved in the months when 
central banks communicate their inflation and output forecasts.  
3.2  The response to shocks 
What are the underlying mechanisms by which enhanced central bank transparency and communication 
leads to a convergence in the views of the private sector? We try to shed light on this question by 17
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studying the responsiveness of forecasters’ views to shocks, i.e. macroeconomic announcements as 
outlined in section 2. In the light of a changed information set, agents need to reassess their earlier 
forecasts, and possibly revise them. This in itself is likely to generate disagreement among forecasters 
outside a rational expectations world. In the presence of a more transparent central bank, agents might 
be in a better position to infer on the likely response of the central bank, and/or might possess better 
information on the shock absorption processes in the economy. Accordingly, the disagreement might be 
less pronounced with more transparent central banks.  
TABLES 7 AND 8 HERE 
Tables 7 and 8 provide a set of results for this hypothesis. The estimated models include the surprise 
component contained in the releases of inflation data (Table 7) and unemployment figures (Table 8), as 
well as the various central bank measures (as before, one at a time) along with an interaction of the two. 
The model is therefore estimated as  
t c i t t c i t c i t c t c t c t c m c t c i oil x s s x , , 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , , 3 , 2 , 1 , , H J J J E E E D D  '  6  :        :    (4) 
where t c s , denotes the surprise component contained in the macroeconomic releases. Our hypothesis is 
that 0 2 ! E  and  0 3  E . The joint hypothesis is confirmed in a large number of cases, suggesting that 
central bank transparency can contribute to a more homogeneous shock absorption of forecasters. 
3.3  Probing the limits  
While the evidence provided so far points to a powerful role of central bank transparency and 
communication in affecting disagreement among forecasters, in this last subsection we turn to the 
question whether there are limits to this role. In the first step
13, we will ask whether economic 
transparency, a key driver identified in the previous analyses, carries diminishing returns, or whether the 
same benefits can be reaped regardless of the level of economic transparency that has already been 
established by a central bank. For that purpose, we will split the economic transparency index into four 
levels, with the thresholds roughly coinciding with the 25
th, 50
th and the 75
th percentile of the 
distribution.
14 The estimated model is  
t c i t t c i t c i
k
t c k k m c t c i oil x , , 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1
3
1
, , , , H J J J E D D  '  6  :      :  
  ¦  (5) 
where t c k x , ,  splits the economic transparency index into dummy variables for the observations of low 
transparency (index equal to 1.5 or 2), medium transparency (index equals 2.5) or high transparency 
(with an index of 3). The level of disagreement for these different levels is tested against those cases 
with very low values of economic transparency (where the index is lower than 1.5). The hypotheses are 
that with higher economic transparency, disagreement should decline, such that E1 to E3 should be 
negative. In the case of diminishing returns, we would see that disagreement is reduced more strongly in 
the lower ranges of the index, and that less additional reduction can be achieved for higher ranges. 
13 We have identified other limits, which are for brevity not reported here. For instance, central bank transparency 
does not seems to affect the persistence of disagreement, nor the magnitude of the effects of a variable’s volatility 
on disagreement. 
14 An alternative might be the inclusion of a quadratic term, as suggested by Van der Cruijsen et al. (2008). This 
would suggest the existence of an optimal level of transparency, after which disagreement starts rising again. Such 
a squared term is indeed statistically significant in one of the models (namely for the current-year CPI 
forecasts).However, the resulting trade-off is such that there is only a very minor increase in disagreement for a 
transparency level of 3. Looking at the results in Table 9, this increase in disagreement is actually not statistically 
significant, such that the fit of the quadratic term must be owed primarily to the decreasing marginal returns when 
moving from very low to higher levels of transparency. 18
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Accordingly, E2 might not be different from E3 any more, whereas both might be substantially smaller 
than E1.
TABLE 9 HERE 
The results of this test are provided in Table 9. With the exception of unemployment forecasts, where 
the Ek seem to be monotonically increasing, there is clear evidence for diminishing returns. Typically, E2
is not statistically significantly different from E3, and there is a relatively large jump when moving from 
E1 to E2. This suggests that there are large benefits to be reaped when moving from very low levels of 
economic transparency, whereas the additional benefits for already very transparent central banks are 
relatively smaller. 
For a final test of the limits, we are interested whether and to what extent central bank transparency and 
communication can also reduce heterogeneity in forecasts of the general public. As mentioned in the 
preceding section, we employ the inflation expectations as expressed in the European Commission’s 
Consumer Survey for that purpose. The model that we have estimated is equal to our earlier benchmark 
model for the professional forecasters, with one exception. The question on inflation expectations is 
preceded by one on inflation perceptions (“How do you think that consumer prices have developed over 
the last 12 months?”), which is also answered in a qualitative fashion. As inflation perceptions might 
affect inflation expectations, we have included the corresponding dispersion measure when explaining 
disagreement in inflation expectations, and the corresponding balance statistic when regressing the 
balance statistic for inflation expectations. This leads to the model 
t c xp e t c perc t t c i t c xp e t c m c t c xp e oil x , , , , 1 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , , , H J J J J E D D  :  '  6  :      :    (6) 
Results are given in Table 10. The left panel reports results using Lacy’s (2006) dispersion measure for 
ordinal variables. The control variables are clearly important (as for the case of professional 
forecasters), indicating that disagreement is persistent and depending on the volatility of inflation, the 
absolute change of oil prices and disagreement about inflation perceptions. Nevertheless, none of the 
central bank transparency and communication measures enters the models significantly. This might not 
be surprising, given that the general public clearly does not follow central bank policies as closely as 
professional central bank watchers and, maybe, rely relatively more on the media coverage of central 
bank policies. However, the complete absence of any central bank effect (e.g. also for quantified 
inflation objectives) might still come somewhat unexpected. To test whether this result is an artifact of 
the type of data that we use (different sample period, different country coverage, qualitative questions 
and, therefore, a rougher measure of disagreement), we have repeated the analysis using the balance 
statistics (the right panel of Table 10). Interestingly, some effects are discovered here: both the existence 
of a quantified inflation objective as well as a high level of economic transparency lead to lower levels 
of inflation expectations.  
TABLE 10 HERE 
4. Conclusions
Acknowledging the existence of information processing constraints and costs has led to the emergence 
of economic models that allow for disagreement among economic agents. That this is a desirable feature 
of any economic model is clearly demonstrated by ample evidence of such disagreement, such as 
present in economic forecasts. In such models, there is a role for central bank transparency and 
communication to reduce the cost of information processing, either by increasing the precision of 
signals received by economic agents, or by making the information acquisition less costly. Over the last 
decades, central banks have undertaken great efforts in that direction, leading to major improvements in 
the predictability of their decisions and/or in the anchoring of inflation expectations. 19
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This paper has studied to what extent greater central bank transparency and communication have 
contributed to a convergence in expectations of economic agents, by testing for their effects on the 
disagreement in forecasts of key macroeconomic variables. Compared to earlier contributions to this 
literature, our tests and proxies for central bank transparency and communication are substantially 
broader and more systematic. The paper finds empirical evidence that several of these measures (in 
particular the announcement of a quantified inflation objective and enhanced transparency about 
economic dimensions of the conduct of monetary policy, such as the release of the central bank’s 
internal forecasts of inflation and output) are effective in that regard, and that the effects are partially 
additive. The reduction in forecaster disagreement is not only statistically significant, but also 
economically important. The findings of the paper indicate that this reduction has been achieved 
because forecasters in countries with more transparent and open central banks manage to update their 
forecasts in response to news in a smoother fashion, generating less disagreement. 
At the same time, the findings of the paper also point at limits to the effects of central bank 
transparency. Increasing economic transparency seems to be particularly powerful at low levels of 
transparency. Yet at higher levels, the additional effects that can be reaped by further enhancements of 
economic transparency appear to be much smaller. Furthermore, the present paper does not find that the 
dispersion in expectations among the general public (in contrast to those of professional forecasters) is 
affected by any of the various measures of central bank transparency that it analyzes. Although we 
stress the limitations of the data sources to measure such expectations of the general public, this finding 
is suggestive that monetary authorities may need to think of alternative ways to extend their reach to 
households and firms. 
Whereas these findings speak a clear language about the appropriateness of economic models that 
incorporate information processing constraints, their normative implications are less straightforward. 
There could be the possibility that the central bank acts as a focal point for economic agents, as 
described for instance in the seminal work by Morris and Shin (2002). In this case, the information 
provided by central banks might crowd out independent information acquisition by the private sector, 
which carries the risk of an inefficiently low level of information acquisition. This possibility has been 
deemed implausible in the real world by Svensson (2006) in his comment on Morris and Shin (2002). 
While not strictly tested, our results also support that forecast accuracy has not really suffered from the 
greater transparency and communication efforts of central banks so far. We leave a more formal test of 
this debate on the efficiency of information acquisition by the private sector for future research. 20
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Table 1: Coverage of the Consensus Economics Dataset 
Average Min Max Start End
Canada 15 11 20 1990:1 2008:11 3439
France 18 11 24 1990:1 2008:11 4085
Germany 27 20 33 1990:1 2008:11 6219
Italy 14 6 21 1990:1 2008:11 3168
Japan 20 12 26 1990:1 2008:11 4456
Netherlands 10 7 14 1995:1 2008:11 1610
Norway 10 6 12 1998:6 2008:11 1219
Spain 14 7 19 1995:1 2008:11 2344
Sweden 13 7 18 1995:1 2008:11 2226
Switzerland 12 6 17 1998:6 2008:11 1503
UK 29 19 39 1990:1 2008:11 6621
US 26 19 33 1990:1 2008:11 5915
Total 18 6 39 1990:1 2008:11 42805
No of forecasters Sample Country Max. no of 
forecasts
Notes: The table provides an overview of the coverage of the Consensus Economics Forecast Dataset. Column 
“Max. no of forecasts” denotes the maximum number of forecasts that is available in a given country for a given 
variable (note that forecasters need not give a forecast for every variable and for every forecasting horizon). 23
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Table 2: Summary statistics for cross-sectional dispersion and forecast accuracy in 
the Consensus Economics Dataset 
Observations Mean Std Min Max
CPI - current year 2342 0.21 0.14 0.00 1.20
CPI - next year 2342 0.40 0.21 0.00 1.90
GDP - current year 2342 0.33 0.21 0.00 1.60
GDP - next year 2342 0.48 0.23 0.00 2.00
Unemployment - current year 1589 0.21 0.19 0.00 2.00
Unemployment - next year 1589 0.40 0.21 0.00 2.50
Short-term interest rates - in 3 months 2342 0.25 0.17 0.00 2.00
Short-term interest rates - in 12 months 2342 0.51 0.27 0.00 2.00
Long-term interest rates - in 3 months 2342 0.28 0.13 0.00 1.50
Long-term interest rates - in 12 months 2342 0.46 0.21 0.00 1.60
CPI - current year 2342 0.31 0.34 0.00 2.53
CPI - next year 2210 0.66 0.52 0.00 3.69
GDP - current year 2342 0.74 0.54 0.00 3.45
GDP - next year 2210 1.16 0.86 0.00 4.49
Unemployment - current year 1589 0.53 0.68 0.00 3.93
Unemployment - next year 1512 0.76 0.66 0.00 3.58
Short-term interest rates - in 3 months 2341 0.38 0.45 0.00 5.62
Short-term interest rates - in 12 months 2268 1.01 0.85 0.00 6.41
Long-term interest rates - in 3 months 2342 0.48 0.45 0.00 6.06
Long-term interest rates - in 12 months 2266 0.92 0.73 0.00 6.69
Mean absolute forecast error
Inter-quartile range
Notes: The table provides summary statistics for the inter-quartile range (top panel) and the mean absolute forecast 
error (lower panel) of the various forecasts obtained in the Consensus Economics dataset. 24
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Quantified Inflation Objective 1.00
Transparency 0.56 1.00
Economic Transparency 0.27 0.53 1.00
Communication 0.22 0.14 0.06 1.00
Notes: The table displays the correlation coefficients between the various measures for central bank transparency 
and communication, for the sample of the Consensus Economics dataset.  25
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Table 4: Central bank transparency and forecaster dispersion, benchmark model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.004 0.011 -0.019 -0.008
0.016 0.016 0.020 0.021
0.000 -0.019* -0.020* -0.007 -0.049** -0.047**
0.004 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.020 0.020
-0.011* -0.011* -0.013 -0.006
0.005 0.005 0.010 0.010
0.396*** 0.397*** 0.390*** 0.396*** 0.389*** 0.660*** 0.657*** 0.636*** 0.661*** 0.636***
0.036 0.036 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.067 0.064 0.058 0.068 0.058
0.127*** 0.126*** 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.117*** 0.139*** 0.151*** 0.127** 0.138** 0.125**
0.021 0.022 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.039 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.042
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.165*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.161***
0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.045 0.046
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330
R2 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
-0.025* -0.016 0.000 0.009
0.013 0.013 0.011 0.013
-0.007* -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.001 -0.042*** -0.042***
0.003 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.013
-0.018*** -0.011* -0.011* -0.008
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
0.526*** 0.525*** 0.509*** 0.529*** 0.507*** 0.593*** 0.593*** 0.577*** 0.592*** 0.577***
0.026 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.017
0.038* 0.041* 0.035 0.044* 0.029 0.050* 0.049* 0.040* 0.049** 0.042
0.018 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.024
0.019 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.021 0.079 0.079 0.080 0.081 0.080
0.051 0.050 0.053 0.049 0.054 0.048 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330
R2 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56
-0.033** -0.032** -0.040* -0.029
0.010 0.010 0.017 0.015
-0.009** -0.013** -0.003 -0.012* -0.037* -0.026
0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.019 0.016
-0.010** 0.000 -0.028** -0.015
0.004 0.005 0.011 0.008
0.763*** 0.775*** 0.779*** 0.781*** 0.763*** 0.650*** 0.658*** 0.652*** 0.661*** 0.644***
0.098 0.096 0.099 0.099 0.098 0.029 0.032 0.039 0.034 0.034
0.356** 0.371** 0.378** 0.361** 0.352** 0.856** 0.865*** 0.870*** 0.799** 0.806**
0.119 0.131 0.135 0.126 0.118 0.246 0.229 0.211 0.262 0.226
-0.016 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 -0.016 0.114 0.105 0.106 0.104 0.116
0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.082 0.076 0.075 0.076 0.079
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582
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Table 4 (continued): Central bank transparency and forecaster dispersion, 
benchmark model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.048** -0.039* -0.065** -0.053**
0.020 0.019 0.022 0.020
-0.008 -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.013** -0.058*** -0.049***
0.005 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.017 0.015
-0.026** -0.016* -0.034** -0.019
0.010 0.008 0.014 0.012
0.460*** 0.476*** 0.464*** 0.478*** 0.443*** 0.584*** 0.598*** 0.585*** 0.603*** 0.567***
0.044 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.039 0.043 0.041
0.074*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.075*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.059***
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010
0.132** 0.121** 0.125** 0.129** 0.135** -0.028 -0.042 -0.037 -0.031 -0.027
0.044 0.046 0.049 0.046 0.047 0.054 0.063 0.064 0.061 0.056
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330
R2 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.55
-0.032** -0.021* -0.032* -0.022
0.011 0.011 0.017 0.015
-0.014*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.018*** -0.055*** -0.051***
0.003 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.012
-0.018** -0.009 -0.017 -0.007
0.008 0.007 0.010 0.008
0.316*** 0.306*** 0.286*** 0.321*** 0.279*** 0.540*** 0.528*** 0.523*** 0.544*** 0.519***
0.046 0.042 0.039 0.044 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.031 0.036 0.034
0.056* 0.057** 0.058** 0.070** 0.046* 0.103** 0.101*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 0.095**
0.030 0.024 0.020 0.029 0.022 0.040 0.032 0.029 0.037 0.032
0.090* 0.080** 0.087** 0.089** 0.091** -0.056 -0.068* -0.062 -0.057 -0.058
0.041 0.035 0.033 0.036 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.035
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330


















Notes: The table shows results of the benchmark model 
t c i t t c i t c i t c m c t c i oil x , , 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , , , H J J J E D D  '  6  :      :   , where  t c i , , : denotes the inter-quartile range. 
Numbers in italics denote standard errors, which allow for clustering by countries. Column (2) contains results 
with the overall transparency index, columns (3) and (5) with the subindex for economic transparency. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 27
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Table 5: Central bank transparency and forecaster dispersion, 1998-2006 
(2) (3) (2) (3)
CPI
0.007** 0.000 0.005 -0.020
0.003 0.013 0.005 0.017
0.339*** 0.345*** 0.494*** 0.492***
0.043 0.043 0.040 0.044
0.145*** 0.159*** 0.007 0.013
0.027 0.026 0.034 0.033
-0.020 -0.031 0.006 -0.013
0.039 0.041 0.039 0.038
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1284 1284 1284 1284
R2 0.55 0.54 0.38 0.38
0.002 -0.023 -0.007 -0.052*
0.004 0.017 0.009 0.024
0.418*** 0.412*** 0.501*** 0.484***
0.026 0.024 0.019 0.023
-0.014 -0.023 -0.008 -0.018
0.014 0.014 0.017 0.016
-0.017 -0.031 -0.024 -0.035
0.072 0.071 0.066 0.065
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1284 1284 1284 1284
R2 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.55
-0.003 -0.014* -0.006 -0.050***
0.005 0.007 0.006 0.012
0.462*** 0.457*** 0.556*** 0.532***
0.042 0.044 0.025 0.021
1.712** 1.743** 1.074 1.235
0.472 0.474 1.299 1.142
0.005 0.002 0.031 0.022
0.042 0.044 0.048 0.046
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 756 756 756 756
R2 0.57 0.57 0.43 0.44
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Table 5 (continued): Central bank transparency and forecaster dispersion,
1998-2006
(2) (3) (2) (3)
-0.012*** -0.035** 0.006 0.002
0.004 0.013 0.004 0.007
0.380*** 0.375*** 0.485*** 0.488***
0.040 0.039 0.046 0.046
0.187*** 0.206*** 0.094** 0.082**
0.047 0.055 0.042 0.037
-0.049 -0.044 -0.006 -0.017
0.050 0.050 0.078 0.076
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1284 1284 1284 1284
R2 0.35 0.35 0.46 0.46
-0.010** -0.039** 0.004 0.001
0.005 0.017 0.006 0.015
0.256*** 0.247*** 0.443*** 0.444***
0.030 0.031 0.041 0.043
0.272* 0.231* 0.310 0.265
0.130 0.111 0.214 0.181
0.065* 0.068* 0.079 0.072
0.034 0.037 0.060 0.056
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1284 1284 1284 1284












Notes: The table shows results of the benchmark model 
t c i t t c i t c i t c m c t c i oil x , , 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , , , H J J J E D D  '  6  :      :   , where  t c i , , : denotes the inter-quartile range. 
Numbers in italics denote standard errors, which allow for clustering by countries. Column (2) contains results 
with the overall transparency index, column (3) with the subindex for economic transparency. All models are 
estimated for the years 1998-2006. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.29
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Table 6: Central bank transparency and forecast accuracy, benchmark model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.021** -0.020** -0.011 -0.005
0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
-0.008*** -0.021* -0.019* 0.000 -0.013 -0.009
0.002 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.008 0.008
0.004 0.010 -0.021*** -0.019***
0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006
0.835*** 0.833*** 0.834*** 0.839*** 0.831*** 0.914*** 0.915*** 0.913*** 0.915*** 0.913***
0.019 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010
-0.032 -0.020 -0.039 -0.028 -0.038 -0.016 -0.014 -0.021 -0.020 -0.025
0.042 0.039 0.036 0.031 0.043 0.051 0.054 0.055 0.053 0.053
-0.156** -0.162*** -0.160** -0.161** -0.158** -0.122 -0.124 -0.125 -0.121 -0.122
0.053 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.088
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2198 2198 2198 2198 2198
R2 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
-0.016 -0.017 -0.003 -0.001
0.012 0.015 0.017 0.016
-0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.016 -0.016
0.006 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.016 0.017
0.003 0.006 -0.003 -0.002
0.017 0.018 0.016 0.016
0.877*** 0.878*** 0.878*** 0.878*** 0.877*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.925*** 0.926*** 0.925***
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
0.004 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.003 -0.004 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008
0.029 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.021
0.171 0.166 0.167 0.166 0.170 -0.228 -0.227 -0.228 -0.228 -0.228
0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.218 0.218 0.217 0.218 0.217
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2198 2198 2198 2198 2198
R2 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
-0.002 -0.007 0.006 -0.001
0.015 0.011 0.018 0.011
0.001 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.026 0.026
0.006 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.027 0.025
0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.003
0.007 0.003 0.025 0.023
0.964*** 0.965*** 0.964*** 0.965*** 0.962*** 0.942*** 0.942*** 0.939*** 0.942*** 0.939***
0.014 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.016
-0.325*** -0.316*** -0.300*** -0.321*** -0.312*** -0.482* -0.474* -0.452 -0.487* -0.461
0.069 0.069 0.080 0.065 0.076 0.227 0.226 0.262 0.250 0.272
0.033 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.120 0.121 0.124 0.122 0.124
0.074 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.074 0.108 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.106
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505
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Table 6 (continued): Central bank transparency and forecast accuracy, 
benchmark model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.021 -0.019 0.003 -0.001
0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021
0.006 -0.012 -0.009 0.008 0.006 0.005
0.005 0.015 0.015 0.005 0.012 0.012
-0.004 0.000 0.015 0.015
0.011 0.011 0.012 0.009
0.749*** 0.752*** 0.750*** 0.751*** 0.749*** 0.923*** 0.924*** 0.923*** 0.923*** 0.924***
0.033 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015
0.050 0.057 0.053 0.054 0.049 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035***
0.041 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010
-0.105 -0.104 -0.108 -0.107 -0.106 0.129 0.141 0.131 0.128 0.129
0.073 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.073 0.168 0.167 0.167 0.168 0.168
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2328 2328 2328 2328 2328 2255 2255 2255 2255 2255
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
0.000 0.016 -0.028** -0.019**
0.010 0.013 0.010 0.008
-0.010** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.010** -0.050*** -0.046***
0.004 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.012 0.011
-0.028** -0.025* -0.017 -0.009
0.010 0.012 0.010 0.010
0.749*** 0.747*** 0.743*** 0.748*** 0.743*** 0.900*** 0.898*** 0.894*** 0.901*** 0.893***
0.056 0.058 0.059 0.056 0.058 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010
-0.116*** -0.130*** -0.133*** -0.122*** -0.128*** 0.077** 0.082** 0.082*** 0.089*** 0.071***
0.012 0.007 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.029 0.027 0.023 0.029 0.023
0.060 0.055 0.058 0.064 0.060 -0.084 -0.099 -0.101 -0.082 -0.100
0.098 0.098 0.101 0.097 0.102 0.199 0.201 0.201 0.200 0.201
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2330 2330 2330 2330 2330 2254 2254 2254 2254 2254


















Notes: The table shows results of the benchmark model 
t c i t t c i t c i t c m c t c i oil x , , 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , , , H J J J E D D  '  6  :      :   , where  t c i , , : denotes the mean absolute 
forecast error. Numbers in italics denote standard errors, which allow for clustering by countries. Column (2) 
contains results with the overall transparency index, columns (3) and (5) with the subindex for economic 
transparency. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 31
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Table 7: Central bank transparency and forecaster dispersion, response to CPI 
surprises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.028 -0.010
0.026 0.028
0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.004
0.003 0.008 0.004 0.014
0.010 -0.029
0.007 0.024
-0.027 0.185*** 0.190** 0.047 -0.008 0.184 0.245*** 0.034
0.057 0.055 0.065 0.030 0.038 0.150 0.050 0.023
0.070 -0.016*** -0.071** -0.086** 0.078 -0.013 -0.084*** 0.120
0.082 0.005 0.026 0.037 0.058 0.016 0.026 0.119
0.323*** 0.334*** 0.331*** 0.335*** 0.474*** 0.473*** 0.466*** 0.476***
0.030 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.059 0.057 0.060 0.056
0.130*** 0.154*** 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.117* 0.126** 0.123** 0.123**
0.037 0.034 0.037 0.040 0.059 0.049 0.048 0.049
-0.013 -0.009 -0.015 -0.006 0.158* 0.155* 0.148* 0.156*
0.070 0.071 0.073 0.073 0.079 0.079 0.080 0.077
Joint hyp. accepted +++ +++ +++ ++ +++
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
0.029** 0.000
0.012 0.019
-0.010*** -0.048*** 0.002 -0.027*
0.002 0.012 0.005 0.013
-0.032** 0.007
0.014 0.017
0.056 -0.183 -0.057 -0.025 0.033 0.095 0.008 -0.020
0.050 0.115 0.045 0.026 0.047 0.128 0.037 0.030
-0.072 0.018 0.023 0.114 -0.082 -0.013 -0.019 -0.079
0.050 0.011 0.021 0.079 0.046 0.013 0.020 0.083
0.492*** 0.484*** 0.472*** 0.491*** 0.596*** 0.595*** 0.584*** 0.594***
0.036 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.031 0.031 0.027 0.031
0.019 0.017 0.009 0.019 0.041 0.040 0.033 0.042
0.022 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.040 0.042 0.036 0.039
-0.070* -0.069* -0.074* -0.065* 0.160** 0.159** 0.155** 0.164**
0.033 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064
Joint hyp. accepted +++ ++ ++ ++
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444
R2 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
0.011** 0.017**
0.004 0.005
0.005 0.017 0.003 -0.009
0.007 0.024 0.003 0.027
0.007 -0.004
0.009 0.008
0.015 0.130 0.312** 0.002 0.004 -0.040 0.228 -0.053**
0.030 0.095 0.108 0.012 0.039 0.248 0.135 0.015
-0.022 -0.013 -0.121** -0.043 -0.071 -0.001 -0.108* -0.014
0.034 0.009 0.042 0.026 0.039 0.025 0.050 0.035
0.497*** 0.497*** 0.498*** 0.498*** 0.553*** 0.554*** 0.548*** 0.554***
0.039 0.035 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.044 0.039 0.042
0.690*** 0.694*** 0.607*** 0.662*** 1.100*** 1.106*** 0.966*** 1.059***
0.124 0.128 0.154 0.120 0.210 0.221 0.226 0.204
-0.039 -0.036 -0.037 -0.037 0.039 0.040 0.034 0.041
0.030 0.027 0.031 0.031 0.092 0.091 0.097 0.092
Joint hyp. accepted ++ ++ +++ ++ +++
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 911 911 911 911 911 911 911 911


















Unemployment - current year Unemployment - next year
Oil Prices
GDP - next year
IQR
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Table 7 (continued): Central bank transparency and forecaster dispersion, 
response to CPI surprises 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.001 0.051***
0.025 0.016
0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.001
0.004 0.011 0.005 0.018
-0.005 -0.014
0.011 0.018
-0.063 0.151 0.119* -0.008 0.077** 0.271* 0.155*** -0.008
0.054 0.101 0.059 0.013 0.030 0.136 0.041 0.027
0.054 -0.017* -0.061** -0.055 -0.109*** -0.029* -0.075*** -0.032
0.058 0.009 0.022 0.047 0.021 0.014 0.017 0.039
0.501*** 0.499*** 0.494*** 0.498*** 0.553*** 0.554*** 0.551*** 0.554***
0.023 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.047 0.046 0.046 0.047
0.186*** 0.184*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.131*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.112**
0.031 0.030 0.032 0.030 0.036 0.033 0.035 0.037
0.098 0.098 0.093 0.103 0.074 0.074 0.072 0.085
0.075 0.072 0.074 0.072 0.077 0.074 0.076 0.074
Joint hyp. accepted +++ +++ +++ +++ +++
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444
R2 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
-0.034*** -0.038
0.009 0.036
-0.007** -0.033** -0.016*** -0.026
0.003 0.012 0.004 0.018
-0.025* 0.003
0.013 0.014
-0.052 -0.105 -0.023 -0.015 -0.061 -0.408** -0.139* -0.013
0.038 0.086 0.053 0.023 0.069 0.167 0.070 0.034
0.059 0.010 0.009 0.067* 0.048 0.040** 0.052 -0.041
0.034 0.008 0.018 0.036 0.062 0.018 0.037 0.040
0.299*** 0.300*** 0.295*** 0.297*** 0.546*** 0.545*** 0.549*** 0.549***
0.041 0.041 0.039 0.042 0.039 0.037 0.036 0.038
0.720* 0.638* 0.573 0.721* 0.970 0.833 0.878 0.967
0.351 0.342 0.330 0.341 0.637 0.612 0.646 0.632
0.088** 0.079** 0.075** 0.086** -0.020 -0.029 -0.028 -0.022
0.038 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.044 0.047 0.045 0.044
Joint hyp. accepted
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444






















Notes: The table shows results of the model 
t c i t t c i t c i t c t c t c t c m c t c i oil x s s x , , 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , , 3 , 2 , 1 , , H J J J E E E D D  '  6  :        :   , where  t c i , , : denotes the 
inter-quartile range, and  t c s ,  the surprise component contained in the releases of CPI inflation. Numbers in italics 
denote standard errors, which allow for clustering by countries. Column (2) contains results with the overall 
transparency index, column (3) with the subindex for economic transparency. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. +++, ++ and + denote statistical significance for the test 
of the joint hypothesis E2>0 and E3<0, based on the share of replications in which the parameter restrictions are 
binding in 500 bootstrap simulations (following, e.g., Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon, 2009). 33
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Table 8: Central bank transparency and forecaster dispersion, response to 
unemployment surprises 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 ) ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
0.109*** 0.066**
0.020 0.026
0.003 -0.009 0.002 -0.021
0.003 0.011 0.004 0.017
-0.008 -0.012
0.006 0.011
0.117*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.072** 0.044*** 0.013*** 0.003***
0.026 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.025 0.011 0.004 0.001
-0.116*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.069** -0.004*** -0.006*** 0.000
0.026 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.002 0.000
0.374*** 0.386*** 0.382*** 0.392*** 0.639*** 0.614*** 0.591*** 0.642***
0.051 0.043 0.041 0.045 0.098 0.082 0.074 0.095
0.054 0.106** 0.107** 0.109** -0.019 0.031 0.029 0.017
0.075 0.043 0.039 0.036 0.101 0.081 0.075 0.070
-0.021 -0.020 -0.020 -0.023 0.168* 0.172** 0.178** 0.169**
0.078 0.083 0.085 0.085 0.079 0.077 0.072 0.075
Joint hyp. accepted +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211
R2 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.54
0.014 0.005
0.011 0.021
-0.008* -0.049*** 0.000 -0.038
0.004 0.015 0.006 0.023
-0.010 -0.010
0.011 0.010
-0.007 0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.057 0.012** 0.002 0.001
0.026 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.048 0.005 0.002 0.000
0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.056 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001**
0.026 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.048 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.545*** 0.541*** 0.523*** 0.546*** 0.623*** 0.622*** 0.600*** 0.624***
0.050 0.048 0.051 0.049 0.026 0.024 0.018 0.025
0.040 0.035 0.027 0.040 0.051 0.052 0.043 0.051
0.024 0.020 0.020 0.023 0.044 0.047 0.042 0.045
-0.003 -0.009 -0.007 0.000 0.135 0.138 0.143 0.139
0.061 0.059 0.060 0.059 0.101 0.103 0.099 0.099
Joint hyp. accepted ++ +++ +++ ++ ++
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211
R2 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
0.034 0.065
0.020 0.077
-0.006 -0.016 -0.003 -0.044*
0.008 0.015 0.010 0.022
0.003 -0.013
0.008 0.008
0.015 -0.011 -0.001 0.001*** 0.052 0.010 -0.001 -0.001**
0.028 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.099 0.009 0.002 0.000
-0.015 0.001* 0.001 -0.001* -0.053 -0.001 0.000 0.000
0.028 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.099 0.001 0.001 0.000
0.456*** 0.450*** 0.453*** 0.457*** 0.595*** 0.589*** 0.566*** 0.595***
0.030 0.039 0.036 0.031 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
1.215*** 1.206*** 1.183*** 1.233*** 1.139*** 1.157*** 1.122*** 1.103***
0.045 0.058 0.069 0.046 0.165 0.217 0.239 0.183
0.018 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.071 0.082 0.091 0.080
0.033 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.102 0.106 0.103 0.108
Joint hyp. accepted ++ ++ +++ +++
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838
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Table 8 (continued): Central bank transparency and forecaster dispersion, 
response to unemployment surprises 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.019 0.024
0.018 0.027
0.000 -0.004 0.003 -0.007
0.003 0.011 0.005 0.020
-0.015 -0.013
0.010 0.019
0.007 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.021 0.027*** 0.007** -0.001
0.037 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.047 0.006 0.003 0.000
-0.006 -0.001*** -0.002** 0.002** -0.021 -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.000
0.037 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.047 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.467*** 0.467*** 0.464*** 0.465*** 0.589*** 0.581*** 0.575*** 0.588***
0.038 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.051
0.205*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.208*** 0.189** 0.190** 0.182** 0.185**
0.043 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.067 0.067 0.062 0.066
0.127 0.131 0.136 0.134 -0.018 -0.010 -0.004 -0.015
0.090 0.093 0.095 0.093 0.108 0.107 0.105 0.106
Joint hyp. accepted ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211
R2 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
-0.012*** 0.010
0.003 0.019
-0.003 -0.016 -0.001 -0.001
0.006 0.017 0.005 0.015
0.007 0.005
0.007 0.011
-0.041*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.088* 0.023*** 0.008*** 0.002***
0.011 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.044 0.003 0.001 0.000
0.040*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.001*** 0.089* -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002***
0.011 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.310*** 0.308*** 0.304*** 0.310*** 0.507*** 0.504*** 0.500*** 0.509***
0.020 0.021 0.023 0.020 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.042
1.316*** 1.255*** 1.138*** 1.331*** 1.595*** 1.474*** 1.441** 1.605***
0.174 0.206 0.224 0.168 0.389 0.390 0.484 0.394
0.057* 0.055* 0.059* 0.055 0.039 0.041 0.053 0.036
0.030 0.030 0.029 0.031 0.075 0.074 0.069 0.066
Joint hyp. accepted ++ ++ +++ +++ ++
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211 1211






















Notes: The table shows results of the model 
t c i t t c i t c i t c t c t c t c m c t c i oil x s s x , , 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , , 3 , 2 , 1 , , H J J J E E E D D  '  6  :        :   , where  t c i , , : denotes the 
inter-quartile range, and  t c s ,  the surprise component contained in the releases of unemployment data. Numbers in 
italics denote standard errors, which allow for clustering by countries. Column (2) contains results with the overall 
transparency index, column (3) with the subindex for economic transparency. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. +++, ++ and + denote statistical significance for the test 
of the joint hypothesis E2>0 and E3<0, based on the share of replications in which the parameter restrictions are 
binding in 500 bootstrap simulations (following, e.g., Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon, 2009). 35
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Table 9: Economic transparency and forecaster dispersion 
CPI














































Ec. Transparency = 1.5 or 2
Ec. Transparency = 2.5
Ec. Transparency  = 3
Long-term rates
next year
current year next year
current year next year
in 3 months in 12 months
in 3 months
Ec. Transparency = 1.5 or 2
Ec. Transparency = 2.5
Ec. Transparency  = 3
in 12 months
Short-term rates
Ec. Transparency = 2.5
Ec. Transparency  = 3
Ec. Transparency = 1.5 or 2
Unemployment
Ec. Transparency = 1.5 or 2
Ec. Transparency = 2.5
Ec. Transparency  = 3
GDP
Ec. Transparency = 1.5 or 2
Ec. Transparency = 2.5
Ec. Transparency  = 3
Notes: The table shows estimates of  t c i t t c i t c i
k
t c k k m c t c i oil x , , 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1
3
1
, , , , H J J J E D D  '  6  :      :  
  ¦ ,
where  t c i , , : denotes the inter-quartile range, and  t c k x , , splits the economic transparency index into dummy 
variables as described in the text. Numbers in italics denote standard errors, which allow for clustering by 
countries. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance against zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
+++, ++ and + denote statistical significance for the test  1    k k E E .36
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1146
January 2010
Table 10: Central bank transparency and household inflation expectations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.005 -1.020**
0.003 0.484
0.001 0.004 -0.090 -0.528**
0.001 0.003 0.153 0.221
0.001 -0.431
0.002 0.317
0.841*** 0.840*** 0.833*** 0.843*** 0.899*** 0.901*** 0.893*** 0.900***
0.020 0.019 0.022 0.019 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.016* 0.016* 0.016* 0.015 1.513 1.671 1.589 1.732
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 1.872 1.826 1.828 1.849
0.100*** 0.104*** 0.111*** 0.102*** 0.013 0.017* 0.026** 0.017
0.016 0.016 0.020 0.016 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3909 3909 3909 3909 3909 3909 3909 3909











Notes: The table shows results of the model 
t c xp e t c perc t t c i t c xp e t c m c t c xp e oil x , , , , 1 1 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , , , H J J J J E D D  :  '  6  :      :   , where  t c xp e , , : denotes the 
Lacy’s (2006) dispersion measure for ordinal variables, d
2, in the left panel, and the balance statistics in the right 
panel, each referring to the EC consumer survey inflation expectations.  t c perc , , : relates to the same concept for 
inflation perceptions. Numbers in italics denote standard errors, which allow for clustering by countries. Column 
(2) contains results with the overall transparency index, column (3) with the subindex for economic transparency. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 37
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